This article reconsiders the mind–body problem from Cartesian dualism to contemporary neuroscience. The central question is whether neuroscientific physicalism provides a decisive answer to Cartesian dualism or merely reformulates the problem at a different explanatory level. The study adopts a problem-oriented conceptual analysis combined with a focused review of neuroscientific evidence, including lesion studies, neural correlates of consciousness, and causal interventions such as brain stimulation. In addition, three influential models of consciousness—Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, and Predictive Processing—are examined as representative frameworks linking neural organization to conscious experience. The analysis suggests that the systematic dependence of mental functions on large-scale brain networks and the manipulability of cognitive content and decision-making undermine the notion of the mind as an ontologically independent substance. At the same time, the article argues that moving from neural correlation and causal intervention to strong ontological identity claims requires methodological and conceptual caution. The persistence of first-person experience and qualitative aspects of consciousness indicates that the transition from dualism to physicalism does not resolve the problem once and for all, but rather shifts its formulation. The article concludes that neuroscientific physicalism should be understood not as a final solution to the mind–body problem, but as a powerful and empirically grounded framework for its ongoing reformulation and investigation.