Abstract 
The transhumanist movement, using biotechnologies and artificial intelligence, seeks to surpass human biological, cognitive, and psychological limits, thereby challenging the concept of the "responsible human" (insān-e mukallaf). This concept forms the core of the relationship between the individual, sharī‘a, and political authority in Islamic political jurisprudence. The study explores how transhumanism, by redefining humans as self-designed and engineerable beings, undermines the political legitimacy of religious-jurisprudential systems. In such systems, the responsible human is rational, free, and accountable to God, with political legitimacy depending on obedience to sharī‘a. Transhumanism disrupts this by producing technological subjects who may reject religious obligations, creating a crisis in jurisprudential legitimacy. This crisis arises from an epistemological gap between religious and transhumanist views of humanity, redefining dignity, free will, and duty. Drawing on Foucault’s biopolitical framework and jurisprudential analysis, the study shows that enhancement technologies turn body and mind into technological objects, eroding religious authority. Three scenarios are proposed—confrontation, adaptation, and transition—with adaptation, through dynamic ijtihād and redefinition of jurisprudential concepts, considered the most effective for preserving legitimacy. Recommendations include interdisciplinary education, advisory councils, equitable policies, and public awareness efforts to help jurisprudential systems address technological change while maintaining religious principles.
Keywords: Transhumanism, Political Legitimacy, Responsible Human, Political Jurisprudence, Justice, Technology.
Introduction
Profound transformations in biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and genetic engineering have positioned humanity beyond classical philosophical, religious, or political definitions. The transhumanist movement seeks to transcend biological, cognitive, and psychological limits through advanced technologies, aiming to create an “upgraded” humanity. This vision fundamentally conflicts with concepts of the “natural human,” “soul,” “body,” “death,” and especially “religious duty and moral responsibility.” In societies where political legitimacy rests on political jurisprudence, it poses both an epistemological challenge and a strategic contest over power foundations. Transhumanism remains in its discursive formation stage — a theoretical, future-oriented possibility rather than an immediate crisis for religious legitimacy. This research therefore examines the potential crisis as a latent risk that could emerge from unaddressed shifts in the human concept and its relation to sharī‘a.
In political jurisprudence, the “responsible human” (insān-e mukallaf) forms the core of individual–political power relations. Religiously, humans are autonomous, aware, and accountable before God and institutions; legitimacy of religious government depends on this anthropology, duties toward sharī‘a, and capacity for divine obligations. Yet if transhumanist technologies reshape identity — via hybrid bodies, augmentable memories, or eliminated death — does such a being remain subject to religious duties? Can religious institutions govern these subjects? If unclear or negative, what fate awaits jurisprudence-based legitimacy?
The article posits transhumanism as a discursive threat to religious power structures, originating in anthropology but profoundly impacting political legitimacy. The central question is: How does transhumanism, by altering the responsible human, challenge legitimacy in religious-jurisprudential systems? The hypothesis holds that it transforms responsible human identity, triggering a crisis in jurisprudential legitimacy logic due to an epistemological gap in the human–divine power relation, unbridgeable without radical rethinking.
Materials & Methods
This research employs an analytical-critical method with an interdisciplinary approach to explore the relationship between transhumanism, the responsible human (insān-e mukallaf), and political legitimacy. Drawing on jurisprudential sources, philosophy of religion, political theory, and philosophy of technology, it enables a multidimensional analysis. Conceptual analysis clarifies key notions such as the “responsible human,” “transhumanism,” “biopolitics,” and “political legitimacy,” revealing ruptures by contrasting the human in political jurisprudence (a rational, autonomous, accountable being) with the transhumanist view (an engineerable, self-designed entity).
Inspired by Michel Foucault, the genealogical method traces historical and discursive shifts in concepts of the human and power. It investigates how the technological subject emerges in transhumanist discourse and affects political legitimacy, uncovering concealed power-knowledge dynamics in the encounter between political jurisprudence and emerging technologies.
Data are derived from documentary and library sources, including Islamic jurisprudential and theological texts, works in philosophy of technology, political and sociological studies, and bioethical literature. These are analyzed comparatively to highlight differences and connections between religious and transhumanist anthropologies and their consequences for political legitimacy.
The analysis follows four stages: (1) extracting the “responsible human” concept from Islamic jurisprudential and political texts, defining humans as rational, autonomous, and accountable before sharī‘a; (2) comparing this with the transhumanist definition to identify conceptual breaks; (3) assessing the rupture’s impact on jurisprudential systems’ legitimacy using Foucault’s biopolitical lens and jurisprudential frameworks; and (4) proposing three response scenarios — confrontation, adaptation, and transition — for political jurisprudence facing transhumanist challenges.
Discussion & Result
The research demonstrates that transhumanism, by redefining humans as self-designed beings, challenges the concept of the responsible human and destabilizes the foundations of legitimacy in jurisprudential systems. This rupture disrupts the traditional relationship between humans, sharī‘a, and power, raising questions about applying religious rulings to enhanced individuals. From a Foucauldian perspective, transhumanism manifests biopower, transforming body and mind into technological objects and generating new power structures. Without conceptual rethinking, religious systems risk declining authority; however, dynamic ijtihād offers a viable response.
The adaptation scenario — preserving core religious principles while flexibly engaging with technology — is deemed most suitable, although it requires interdisciplinary education and advisory councils. Ignoring these transformations risks an identity crisis, whereas proactive engagement sustains jurisprudential cohesion. Additionally, a fourth scenario of mutual dissolution or “techno-theological integration” is considered, in which religion reinterprets itself through technology, potentially giving rise to techno-religious legitimacy. This aligns with Foucauldian genealogy, where competing discourses reproduce power through mutual integration rather than pure opposition.
Conclusion
Transhumanism constitutes not only a scientific-philosophical challenge but also a profound political-social threat to jurisprudential systems. Without rethinking foundational jurisprudential concepts (dignity, obligation, embodiment), political legitimacy faces serious risk. The adaptation approach, grounded in dynamic ijtihād, interdisciplinary dialogue, equitable policy-making, and public awareness initiatives, represents the most effective strategy for preserving religious coherence in the era of accelerating technological transformation. It is recommended that jurisprudential institutions incorporate biotechnology and digital ethics into formal training, establish permanent techno-ethical advisory bodies, and promote broad societal discourse to enable jurisprudential systems to respond constructively to technological change while faithfully upholding religious principles.