Mahdi Behniafar; Mahdieh Rouhi
Abstract
Abstract:
This paper is about the condemnation of 1277 that was issued by the bishop of Paris (Etienne Tempier) against the Aristotelian, Thomistic and Averroist theological teachings. This condemnation was initially aimed at protecting the doctrine of God's absolute power and critique of the philosophical ...
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Abstract:
This paper is about the condemnation of 1277 that was issued by the bishop of Paris (Etienne Tempier) against the Aristotelian, Thomistic and Averroist theological teachings. This condemnation was initially aimed at protecting the doctrine of God's absolute power and critique of the philosophical and theological reasoning about God, but later it led to new developments that were outside of the initial goals of its founders and were in conflict with it.
This research, using an analytical approach, tries to provide an analysis of the backgrounds and philosophical and theological disagreements that led to the condemnation of 1277, and to present a map of its conceptual scope. Then, we have discussed some of the epistemological and theological implications of this condemnation, among which the doctrine of God's absolute power is the most prominent and one of the main goals of this condemnation. But we have also raised and analyzed the long-term implications such as nominalism, secularism, and the development of modern science and its departure from the Platonic perspective, and it has shown that these are hidden implications that were not only unintended by the founders of the condemnation but also in conflict with their main lines of thought.
Keywords:
Condemnation of 1277, Absolute power of God, Nominalism, Modern Science, Secularism, Latin Averroists, Thomas Aquinas.
Introduction:
In 1277, Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, was ordered by the Roman Catholic Church to examine the philosophical and theological teachings presented at the University of Paris and prevent the intellectual deviations of its teachers and students. Then on March 7, 1277, Tempier issued a condemnation against the philosophical and theological teachings of the Aristotelians of his time. This declaration was later known as the Condemnation of 1277.
In this article, we have discussed the historical background of this condemnation since the beginning of the 13th century, its activists in the late Middle Ages, and also the analysis of its content. Then we have analyzed its theological, scientific and philosophical results and implications. Some of these results were not initially predicted by Tempier and his colleagues but have occurred over time.
Materials and Methods:
Documentary analysis of this condemnation was the first step we have taken in this paper. We have examined both the content structure of its introduction and the content of the 219 condemned philosophical and theological propositions attached to it and then we have provided a secondary analysis of the results of issuing this condemnation.
Discussion:
In the introduction of the condemnation of 1277, two major objections were made to the teachers and students of the University of Paris and their curriculum: 1. Violation of the law; This probably refers to the rules laid down in the regulations and curricula that the Church defined for the University of Paris in 1231 during the reign of Pope Gregory IX. and 2. violation of the principles of the Catholic faith; The principles that the 219 deviant propositions attached to this condemnation violate, and the university president has been asked to inspect these violations within 5 days and find a solution for them.
Although "students and teachers of the University of Paris" have been condemned in the condemnation of 1277, in fact the opinions of three groups of philosophers and theologians have been condemned in this condemnation: 1. Latin Averroists, 2. Thomas Aquinas, medieval Thomists and Scholastic Theologians, as well as 3. Muslim Aristotelian philosophers who transmitted Aristotelian teachings and some Islamic theological teachings to medieval thinkers through their interpretations and translations. The most important charge against these three categories of people was that they presented a reasonable and lawful image of God and his action in nature and in relation to man and the world; In this way, these philosophers and theologians, wanted to violate the Absolute Power of God and show it as conditional.
In the list attached to this declaration, 219 propositions and doctrines have been mentioned and condemned. According to the research done by Hissette (Hissette, 1977, p.1), 79 propositions are explicitly mentioned in the works of some or all of the above three categories of thinkers; 72 propositions are similar and close to some teachings and opinions of these philosophers and theologians and 68 statements are basically not found in the works of these philosophers. If we want to make an optimistic judgment about the 68 recent doctrines that did not have actual believers, we must say that the founders of this condemnation wanted to prevent future people from believing in these bad doctrines; But the pessimistic view is that the condemnation of 1277, by exaggerating, intends to make the danger of these philosophers appear more serious and beyond what it is.
Anyway, two things are certain: one is that some of these doctrines that have been condemned were not popular at all in the works of Aristotelians or other works of that time and secondly, it is not possible to find a specific philosopher, school or circle of thought that believed in all these teachings at the same time.
Conclusion:
Some of the epistemological, Scientific and theological elements of the condemnation of 1277 that we analyzed in this article are as follows: 1. This condemnation clearly favors a dogmatic reading over a rational approach to the Bible. The intellectual basis of this condemnation was sometimes the theological attitude of Augustinian thinkers in the Middle Ages and sometimes it was similar to the purely dogmatic and superficial approach that existed in the anti-rational behavior of advanced thinkers such as Tertullian. 2. Focusing on an absolutist, capricious, unpredictable and lawless image of God's behavior, under the pretext of not violating "God's absolute power", is one of the most important examples of the previous point. 3. From the point of view of Tempir and his colleagues, one of the essentials of believing in the "absolute power of God" and that nothing is impossible for him is the doctrine of the multiplicity of created worlds; This means accepting the existence of other created worlds whose natural laws and metaphysical rules governing them are different from the laws and rules governing our world, and this has no contradiction with the basic principles of reason. 4. The method that Tempir and his colleagues took to defend the doctrine of the "Absolute Power of God" theoretically led to a naïve ontological and theological nominalism and the negation of universals and natures. In this way, God's action does not fall under any general rules and instead, it is unpredictable. 5. From the point of view of Pierre Duhem, the condemnation of 1277 can be considered as the beginning of modern sciences, especially because it freed natural science and cosmology from the Aristotelian and Scholastic views (Duhem, 2018, p.2) and then it opened the way for new hypotheses and attitudes in the field of science. 6. After the condemnation of 1277, theology and philosophy (which included science at that time) were gradually separated from each other. This happened not only in the University of Paris but also in other medieval universities. The cause of this separation was the separation of the philosophers from the theologians who rejected and excommunicated them. This independence led to the appearance of an early form of secularism in the Christian community.
Here, the founders of the declaration of 1277 not only did not foresee the fourth to sixth points, but the fifth and sixth points were actually in conflict with their original goals and against their basic teachings.
Amin Motevallian
Abstract
AbstractSome historians of science believe that alchemy is a part of religious practice and rituals, and as a result, its history is cited under the history of religions. Along with this belief, the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung believes that alchemy is part of the history of psychology, which aims to ...
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AbstractSome historians of science believe that alchemy is a part of religious practice and rituals, and as a result, its history is cited under the history of religions. Along with this belief, the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung believes that alchemy is part of the history of psychology, which aims to discovery the complex and deep structure of the human psyche. Critics of these two approaches claim that religious and psychological concepts have not been used as much as material and experimental (laboratory) actions and practices have been used in alchemy, so it cannot be considered as a part of history of religions or psychology. In these historiographical approaches, there are many indications and references to the alchemical theories of the Greco-Egyptian period, one of the most important and perhaps the most documented of them is the theoretical framework of Zosimos, which is called "spiritual alchemy". Reviewing this framework shows that Zosimos' alchemical theories can be somewhat controversial for all three approaches. In this article, while looking at the basic concepts in this alchemical framework, the relationship between nature (matter) and supernatural powers and the interactions of matter-human-divinity have been studied. KeywordsSpiritual Alchemy, Zosimos, Cosmic Sympathy, Nature, Divinity, Epoptics. IntroductionThe centrality of the concept of soul in alchemical writings attributed to Zosimos has caused some historians to named his alchemy as spiritual alchemy. However, the issue is raised whether the meaning of spiritual here is simply referring to the duality of soul and body, which is also used to explain the structure of metals, or beyond that, this concept refers to vegetable, animal and human’ one? Therefore, the alchemy of Zosimos can be considered a spiritual practice, which through the understanding of the similarity between the soul embedded in metals and the soul of plants and humans - especially the human soul - seeks to provide an explanation of the process of changes in the material world of metals as well as changes in the human soul. In other words, Zosimos believes that at the same time as the change in the body of a metal that occurs according to the laws of nature, not only its soul also changes according to supernatural laws, but the soul and sprite of alchemist also changes. As a result, it can be said that Zosimos' alchemical theory is not only a theory based on the principles and rules of the natural sciences of his era, but it is a set of interactions between supernatural, religious, philosophical and non-physical concepts with the natural components of an alchemical practice. According to some contemporary historians of alchemy, such as Grimes, Zosimos, unlike other Greco-Egyptian alchemists, prescribes a philosophical lifestyle for his colleagues, which includes those moral values that the path Reaching them is through the path of self-change, which is achieved by contemplation and self-refining it. In fact, Zosimos draws a cycle in which the alchemist goes from the material nature to the spiritual state and returns from the spirituality to the material nature. If the alchemist enters this cycle, he will answer the question of how metals reveal the presence of divine while refining his soul. The connection between the understanding of the presence of divine in the body of metals and the explanation of the interpretations resulting from it, which is subject to various natural and unnatural factors, is the core of Zosimos's claim in his alchemical doctrine plan, which dimensions and main components are examined in this article.Materials and methodsThis article is a library study, in order to organize and write it, several books and articles in the field of Greco-Egyptian alchemy in general and Zosimos alchemy in particular have been studied and criticized. Some of these articles dealt with the technical and alchemical aspects of Zosimos's works, while others focused on the philosophical and historiographical aspects of Zosimos's works. Discussion and ResultsThe role of the incorporeal component, which Zosimos considers to be pneuma, is more important for him in alchemical processes. This component has a completely material and physical behavior in that part of the alchemical process, which is the material part, but it exceeds the level of material behavior in the area of non-physical changes of Zosimos. Of course, his idea of non-physical changes refers to the same coloring vapor, which in his explanations is directly related to the human agent or the alchemist. Zosimos considers this vapor to be the coloring pneuma in which the metal must be immersed in order to accept the new color, which corresponds to baptism. But reaching this pneuma is not only a function of material actions, but also a function of the alchemist's mind and states. On the other hand, Zosimos considers the two concepts of race and cosmic sympathy which were derived from the system of creation of the cosmos (Kosmopiia) as two basic concepts that refer to the natural methods of making tincture in Jewish religious texts. Based on this and relying on metaphorical concepts including the notion of sacrifice, he tries to explain the sympathy in the natural and unnatural areas of the world. The product of this thinking is that he considers alchemy as a theurgy that uses the divinity in alchemical operations in a hierarchical system. ConclusionThere are three historical viewpoints about Zosimos' alchemy; The first view considers areas of his alchemy as a part of the history of science. The second view holds that his alchemy is under the history of psychology, and the third view considers Zosimos' alchemy to be originally a part of the history of religions. Besides examining these three points of view, we can also think of another idea. An idea that looks after his strong social concerns in a way that considers serious moral considerations as the basis of his alchemy.
ghorban elmi; Nazanin جلیلی
Abstract
AbstractThis article, in a descriptive and analytical way, has investigated the concept and characteristics of Mana and the sacred in Marett's intellectual system. He, who primarily focuses on the anthropology of religion, emphasized emotion and feeling as the basic principle of analytical psychology ...
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AbstractThis article, in a descriptive and analytical way, has investigated the concept and characteristics of Mana and the sacred in Marett's intellectual system. He, who primarily focuses on the anthropology of religion, emphasized emotion and feeling as the basic principle of analytical psychology of mind and human personality and the psychological components of religious belief, and instead of Tyler's animism, he offered pre-animism or animatism (the experience of Mana) as the first and the original religious experience. Marett interprets the subject of religious consciousness as Mana or sacred. The feeling of Mana is the feeling of the presence of a wonderful and mysterious power or force that forms the essence of primitive religion. Basically, religion was formed in response to the feeling of awe and in connection with it. The feeling of Mana is a mixture of fear, wonder and attraction that creates awe in humans. His minimal definition of religion includes the taboo-Mana formula, where taboo is the negative aspect of a sacred or supernatural entity, which "should not be approached without restraint." In its positive aspect, it is named Mana. Things that have Mana are also taboo. Marett's Mana, unlike Codrington's, is not power, but is entirely supernatural, i.e. religious and the core of religion.Key words: religion, sacred, supernatural, Marett, Mana IntroductionRobert Ranulph Marett, a British anthropologist, was a supporter of the evolutionist school of cultural anthropology. He primarily focused on the anthropology of religion. Marett's first academic position was a philosophy teaching chair in Oxford, where he became interested in anthropology after reading the book "Tradition and Myth" by Andrew Long. In 1910, Marett succeeded Tylor in the chair of cultural anthropology in Oxford. Criticizing Tylor's theory that early religion was belief in spirits, he proposed the theory of pre-animism and belief in a power called Mana. He believed that in Mana, we have evidence of a pre-animism stage; the stage in which the feeling dominates the thought or in which the thought is still not separated from the feeling. Marett was influential in bringing Mana to a wide English-speaking audience. His attempts to use this concept to explore the nature of supernatural and magical power are particularly telling of the difficulties that modern social theorists faced in trying to address issues of religion and social power. Therefore, in the opinion of this anthropologist, we see a new orientation in the study of primitive religion. His analysis of the history of religion was published for the first time in the book "The Threshold of Religion" published in 1909 and then elaborated in his other works. The first article of this book, which was published under the title "Pre-animistic religion" and which earned Marett's fame this way, contained his most key and original ideas, especially the concept of Mana, which is the subject of this article.Research methodologyThe method of this writing is descriptive-analytical and in some cases content analysis, which wants to present a general and clear picture of his attitude and opinion about the subject of religious experience. what is his approach in the field of the science of religion? What is his conceptualization of religion and religious evolution? It examines the concept and characteristics of Mana and sacred matter in Mart's intellectual system and answers the question of what the concept of Mana has as a subject of religious awareness, especially among primitive people.Discussion In order to understand the concept of Mana and sacred matter and its position and characteristics in Marett's theory of science of religion, one must first define and perceive religion. In the first step of his theorizing, Marett presented the definition of religion and after pointing out the difficulties of this matter, he said: "It can be considered as an abbreviation of a composite or concrete state of the mind, in which different feelings and ideas, together and directly are stimulation and source of action. To define and express the nature of religion, it should be said that "The Threshold of Religion", Marett's most important book about the nature and origin of religion, focuses on the concept of "threshold" between the natural world and the supernatural. Therefore, he considers religion to be the transition to the world beyond nature and communicating with God or Mana. In his explanation, Marett, instead of religion, pays attention to religiosity and considers it a feeling of awe and amazement in facing the mysterious and inexplicable aspects of the world, and this feeling of the sacred is the basis of all religious experiences. Therefore, the nature of religion or religious experience is to find ways through which people seek to connect with the Divine. Marett considers early religion not to be "belief in spirits" but animatism, or the feeling and belief in "Mana". In discussing what constitutes religious consciousness, Marett believes that despite the endless quarrels over words, anthropologists seem to be largely in agreement about the realities with which religion deals. These realities belong to the mental system and the objective system, and at the same time they are so related that they all have a common feature. Marett does not know a better term to express that common feature than "sacred matter".Conclusion Criticizing Tylor's theory, Marett considers it "short-sighted and limited because of its too much rationalism" and calls religion the feeling and experience of Mana (power). Marett says that religion is basically based on emotions and feelings and ideas and concepts are of secondary importance in it. This view had a great influence on the later studies of religion. Rudolf Otto's conception and understanding of the sacred was influenced by it, and Marett had an influence on sociologists of early religion such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, etc. The root of Mana is in the Pacific Ocean region. Marett's point of view in explaining the origin of religion is one of the emotionalist points of view. By criticizing the rationalist theories before him, with a psychological approach, Marett considers the individual experience of primitive man as a fundamental factor in the origin of religion and emphasizes the emotional dimension of this experience. Marett considers the origin of religion to be a feeling that is a mixture of fear, respect and amazement, which is induced in the primitive man when he encounters the world around him. He considers beliefs to be merely the manifestation of hidden roots - that is, feelings - which are the source of religious rituals and behaviors, and beliefs play a secondary role in religion. The primitive man sees his surroundings full of objects and phenomena that are mysterious to him. He attributes this mysterious feature to a transcendental and mysterious "force" that cannot be "perceived" but can be "felt" and is all-pervasive. According to Mart, this feeling is the focus of a stage in the history of the evolution of religion, which he calls "supernaturalism" and believes that this stage is the precursor to the emergence of human religious thought. In the pre-animist theory, a vague force called Mana takes the first place and belongs to religious consciousness. In criticizing Mart's point of view, it should be said that the primitive man in Marett's view is an excessively dreamy and passive creature who constantly feels "fear mixed with awe" that the world around him instills in him; He is afraid and trembling. But ethnological data shows that primitive man is not so much subject to nature.
Masoud Toossi Saeidi
Abstract
In order to examine the rationality of the belief in the “disparity in the relationship between science and religion in the cases of evolutionary biology and cosmology,” this article focuses on evolutionary biology, cosmology, and religion (theology) from the perspective of epistemic entities. ...
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In order to examine the rationality of the belief in the “disparity in the relationship between science and religion in the cases of evolutionary biology and cosmology,” this article focuses on evolutionary biology, cosmology, and religion (theology) from the perspective of epistemic entities. Accordingly, the disparity between these epistemic entities refers to the difference in the way they logically align with each other. Initially, the approach and assumptions accepted for establishing this argument are explained. In this section, it is clarified that the approach of this article is to present an evidential argument, and its most important assumption is the epistemic independence of evolutionary biology and cosmology from each other. Additionally, it is explained that by religion, the belief in the existence of a concept of God that implies the purposiveness of divine action is meant. Subsequently, the main middle term of this argument, which is the analysis of the implications of evolutionary biology and cosmology for purposiveness, is discussed in detail. In this discussion, purposiveness is precisely defined, and the content of existing and conventional theories and models in evolutionary biology and cosmology is considered, rather than the philosophical debates of biology or cosmology or philosophical interpretations of theories. Thus, the content of the premises of the argument is obtained, and its conclusion is presented at the end of this section. However, due to the fundamental nature of this claim, the logical-formal structure of the argument used to support the claim is explained further. This formal structure, which is explained based on the logic of probabilities, clarifies the degree of validity of the conclusion and the type of relationship between it and the premises. Following this, some of the important implications of this conclusion are mentioned.KeywordsRelationship between Science and Religion, Theology, Evolutionary Biology, Cosmology, Guidedness1. IntroductionThe application of the term “Science and Religion Relationship” in the current era has gained a refined and specific meaning since the mid-1960s. The establishment and publication of the journal Zygon and the release of Ian Barbour's book Issues in Science and Religion (1966) both in 1966 symbolize the beginning of a prolific period of philosophical discussions and intellectual explorations concerning the relationship between science and religion from that time to the present. In this article, the relationship between science and religion will be considered in the context of these discussions.In one sense, this beginning has undergone two stages up to today. The first stage, starting from the 1960s and extending to around 1990, is characterized by a holistic view concerning the relationship between science and religion. By holistic view, it is meant that during the specified historical period, the relationship between science and religion is considered as a general category, and efforts are made to analyze the description of this relationship (e.g., independence or conflict). The second stage of the discussions, starting from the 1990s and continuing to the present, analyzes the relationship between specific theories in science and specific notions in theology in detail (De Cruz 2022, sec. 1.1. & 3). The following titles are examples from the discussions of the past three decades:The theory of evolution, the doctrine of creation, and the existence of an intelligent designerFundamental constants in cosmology and the fine-tuning of the universeQuantum uncertainty, specific divine action, and miracleChaos theory and divine actionComplexities of natural hierarchies and the afterlifeSimilarly, during this period, the discussions in the philosophy of science regarding biology and physics have become specialized. From the famous debate by J. J. C. Smart about biology not being a science (Smart 1959, 365–67) to the distinction between the two fields of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology and their further detailed development as separate disciplines, all pertain to the same period and have paralleled discussions on science and religion. These two historical trends form the academic and specialized literature background for the subject of this article.To examine the rationality of the belief in a "Disparity in the Relationship of Science and Religion in the Two Cases of Evolutionary Biology and Cosmology," this article considers evolutionary biology, cosmology, and religion (theology) from the perspective of epistemic entities.2. Materials and MethodsThe breadth and diversity of evolutionary biology and cosmology theories and their implications, the existence of borderline issues and different interpretations, and the continuous advancements in science make evolutionary biology and cosmology very broad and dynamic epistemic entities. This breadth and dynamism create a very broad context for examining their relationship with religion.The broad range of topics that can be emphasized to examine the relationship between evolutionary biology and cosmology with religion necessitates focusing on a subset of these topics. In this article, the emphasis on "purposefulness" provides this requirement. Limiting the scope of the examination, along with the continuous developments in sciences and the breadth of their conceptual scope, makes the final conclusion not definitive and deductive, as the examination conducted is limited. Therefore, the type of argument in this regard is evidential and probabilistic (as opposed to deductive); that is, the analyses and content of the argument's premises support its conclusion.3. Discussion and ResultThe fundamental difference between these epistemic entities refers to their logical compatibility with each other: Consider three propositions p, q, and r. If the simultaneous truth of p and q is possible, but the simultaneous truth of p and r is impossible, then there is a fundamental difference in the relationship between q and r with p. The term "fundamental difference" in this article refers to such a relationship, and the investigation into whether such a difference exists in the relationship between evolutionary biology and cosmology with religion is conducted through evaluating their implications on "purposefulness."If we denote the implication of religion on purposefulness as T, the implication of evolutionary biology on purposefulness as EB, and the implication of cosmology on purposefulness as C, then:T asserts that the universe must be purposeful.EB claims that the universe, in terms of characteristics related to various biological levels, beneficial and harmful traits, and biodiversity (at least from the perspective of adaptation), cannot be considered purposeful.C posits that the universe, in terms of its fundamental equations, laws, and constants, can be considered purposeful.Therefore, at first glance, it seems that the simultaneous truth of T and EB is impossible – or, more accurately, as will be the basis in the paper, this assumption has fundamental challenges – but the simultaneous truth of T and C is possible.4. ConclusionThe argument presented in this paper has an important implication: believing in a fundamental difference in the relationship between science and religion in the two cases of biology and physics is a rational belief. Based on this, we should speak of the "relationships" between science and religion, rather than a singular "relationship."
Mohammad Ali Ashouri Kisomi; Maryam Parvizi
Abstract
This paper examines the ethical agency of artificial general intelligence (AGI). In many studies, the ethical agency of AGI is divided into four categories: 1) Ethical-impact agents, 2) Implicit ethical agents, 3) Explicit ethical agents, and 4) Full ethical agents. This paper will deploy a critical-analytical ...
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This paper examines the ethical agency of artificial general intelligence (AGI). In many studies, the ethical agency of AGI is divided into four categories: 1) Ethical-impact agents, 2) Implicit ethical agents, 3) Explicit ethical agents, and 4) Full ethical agents. This paper will deploy a critical-analytical method to examine the fourth category, namely full ethical agents in AGI. If AGI is possible, such intelligence would have many capabilities, and therefore, there would be many ethical concerns. This categorization of ethical agency has been repeatedly used by researchers, and there is a need for re-examination. The results of this study show that if AGI is possible, it should be placed in the category of a full ethical agent. However, such a full ethical agent has two characteristics: first, this agent can learn human ethical principles or infer other ethical principles from them; however, it should not be assumed that it considers human ethical principles to be its ethical principles; and second, this agent can form its own goals and ethical principles, and these principles may be different from or contrary to human ethical principles.
jalal paykani; kaweys sure
Abstract
Abstract
Introduction:
Scientific explanations of religious experience are a serious challenge for religious experience. In the second half of the 20th century, cognitive science has involved itself with the issue of religion. Among the approaches of this knowledge, the conceptual metaphor ...
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Abstract
Introduction:
Scientific explanations of religious experience are a serious challenge for religious experience. In the second half of the 20th century, cognitive science has involved itself with the issue of religion. Among the approaches of this knowledge, the conceptual metaphor approach of Lakoff and Johnson has a special place; Especially the claim of the thinkers of this field that the mind is basically physical and abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical is a very serious challenge for religious experience. In examining the critical view of the approach of conceptual metaphors, we will notice the results that are in favor of the approach of religious experience; Due to the religious experience, the generalization and convergence of the central metaphor is degraded. On the other hand, religious experience makes us believe that even with lived experience, religious matters are not basic or objective categories that do not require metaphors. On the other hand, by examining the religious experience, we are convinced to believe that man, as a being who has the ability to perceive metaphysical matters, inevitably has a non-physical essence; Because the understanding of metaphysical matters requires dimensions beyond the physical dimension. In this research, the aim is to examine the view of this approach to religious experience and against those who defend religious experience.
Method and material
The research was done with descriptive research method. First, conceptual metaphors have been examined with the approach of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and then known religious experiences have been discussed. In the next step, a critical look at conceptual metaphors for religious experience and possible answers from philosophers of religion is included.
The view of the metaphor-oriented approach in science or cognitive sciences is an experimental view, the aim of which is to deal with the cognitive aspect of language. The mentioned approach in cognitive linguistics is also called empirical realism. The study course of this linguistic approach is interdisciplinary; In this way, by studying the language, he intends to respond to the ontological and epistemological developments in dealing with the relationship between religious experience and language. If the basis of this approach is the above view, this view in dealing with religious experience will lead to a multi-directional interaction, which in the view of philosophers and thinkers, the metaphor-oriented approach will end in physical experience and physicality view. In this chapter, while dealing with the main and secondary issues, the author's main goal, which is to investigate the role of conceptual metaphors in explaining religious knowledge, is clarified.
Result and Discussion:
The results of this research indicate that conceptual metaphors are not 100% applicable to the issue of experience and religious experiences and the language of reporting the aforementioned experiences, and since there are possibilities of disconfirming the rule of metaphorical language, it cannot be accepted. Although the main representatives of conceptual metaphors approach believe that this approach (metaphor-based approach) has self-evident principles, but on the other hand, they do not know it completely and without exception that this self-sewing issue is self-evident and indisputable.
Conclusion:
It does not seem that the philosophers of the metaphor-oriented approach are in the direction of developing a better interaction between science and religion, or that they want to consider the interaction between conceptual metaphors in scientific knowledge and the problem of religious experience. ; Rather, with the attitude that especially the philosophers of the metaphor-oriented approach have taken, they intend to show that the examples of knowledge of religious experience are abstract things that the human mind simulates on the basis of empirical and tangible things. And in a sense, religious experiences are made from empirical facts, and for this purpose, the mind attributes imaginary schemas from physical objects to metaphysical and extrasensory matters; At the same time, this relationship is completely virtual and metaphorical. Based on the ontological results of this approach, it cannot be assumed that the religious experience indicates and observes the truth in recognizing the examples of religion, and hence the language that is used to give meaning to religious propositions. It has been purely unreal and virtual.
Mahmoud Mokhtari
Abstract
Abstract
The issue of this article is whether it is possible to regulate users' behavior without referring to ethics, and solely based on the architecture of virtual space? In this regard, three approaches are examined: 1- Adequacy of cyberspace architecture without the need for ethics 2- Compliance ...
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Abstract
The issue of this article is whether it is possible to regulate users' behavior without referring to ethics, and solely based on the architecture of virtual space? In this regard, three approaches are examined: 1- Adequacy of cyberspace architecture without the need for ethics 2- Compliance of the code with the principles of ethics 3- Necessity of hard ethics (before cyberspace architecture) and soft ethics (after architecture). In this context, the views of Lawrence Lessig (first approach), Richard Spinello (second approach) and Luciano Floridi (third approach) are discussed. In order to evaluate the aforementioned approaches, two criteria of "theoretical acceptability" (the requirement that the preferred view must be defensible based on the moral theories) and "technological acceptability" (the requirement that preferred view must be executable from the engineering point of view). Therefore a combinatory view is defended, which is operationally based on the architecture (code) of cyberspace, but from the theoretical aspect, it also depends on Ethical principles (hard ethics) and rely on case-by-case ethical judgments of experts (soft ethics).
Keywords: Cyberspace Architecture, Digital Ethics, Lessig, Spinello, Floridi.
Introduction
John Caiazza (2005), emphasizing the role of technology in secularization, coined the term "technosecularism." He argues that technosecularism implicitly includes an ethical theory according to which "what technology can provide" should be utilized without regard to ethical rules. It seems that Lawrence Lessig's approach (1997, 1998a, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006) to cyberspace can be interpreted as a technosecularist perspective. In Lessig’s view "code is law" and there is no role for ethics in regulating behavior. The issue addressed in this article is whether it is possible to regulate user behavior solely based on the architecture of cyberspace (code), without referring to ethics. In this article, in addition to Lessig's approach, alternative views from Spinello and Floridi are also presented and examined. By defining two criteria, "theoretical acceptability" and "technological feasibility," it is shown that none of the aforementioned perspectives are adequate, and therefore, a combined viewpoint is ultimately defended.
Materials and Methods
This article is a theoretical and philosophical research that is based on a qualitative research, which involves examining and analyzing different concepts and perspectives in the reliable sources of the literature.
Discussion and Results
Lawrence Lessig (1998b) analyzes four regulators that influence an individual's behavior in society through his "pathetic dot theory": law, norms, market, and architecture, which control behavior through punishment, stigma, price, and physical burdens, respectively. Lessig correspondingly discusses four regulators of individual behavior in cyberspace that correspond to these regulators, with the main focus being the latter, the architecture of cyberspace. He believes that the hardware, software, and protocols that constitute cyberspace regulate it, and this architecture of cyberspace (code) is the law of cyberspace. Although Lessig speaks of "norms," he does not introduce "ethics" in the sense of universal norms or values. This merit is evident in the approaches of Richard Spinello and Luciano Floridi (at two different levels).
Spinello (2001, 2002, 2011, 2014, 2021), regarding the regulation and ethics of cyberspace, considers Lessig's model of the four regulators to be inspiring but insufficient. He argues that ethical principles should be viewed governing the four regulators Lessig considers, rather than at their level. For instance, the architecture of cyberspace (code) should also be based on ethical principles and written under their guidance. What Spinello (2021) emphasizes are the "ideals and ethical principles" that are universal and constant, rather than relative and variable "cultural norms".
Nevertheless, Spinello believes that since the internet lacks a "physical center," it also has no "moral center" that can be held accountable for the flow of information in the network. A more far-reaching perspective on the relationship between the cyberspace and ethics should be sought in Floridi's approach.
Floridi (2018a, 2018b) considers ethics to be essential both before and after the formulation of the regulating laws. He refers to the ethical principles used in regulating and structuring the digital space as "hard ethics." Hard ethics essentially consists of the rules we consider as right and wrong or moral imperatives when discussing values, rights, duties, responsibilities, and so on. However, since general laws and regulations cannot cover all details, in cases of failure or ambiguity of general rules in specific judgments, individuals or organizations must rely on "soft ethics" to decide what role they should play in what Floridi calls the "infosphere." Floridi (2006) defines the term infosphere (in correspondence with biosphere) as "the entire informational environment created by all informational entities," which includes the informational entities themselves, their characteristics, their interactions, and so forth, and also encompasses "offline and analog information spaces." Therefore, Floridi's approach represents a kind of interweaving of ethics (both hard and soft) and the architecture of cyberspace (code), as he believes that ethical principles are not outside the legal system but are implicitly embedded as integral components of the law. In fact, law is shaped and constrained by the conduit of ethics rather than being solely dictated by it.
Conclusion
In response to the question of whether it is possible to regulate user behavior solely based on the architecture of cyberspace and without reference to ethics, the views of Lawrence Lessig, Richard Spinello, and Luciano Floridi represent a spectrum of approaches. To compare these perspectives, we define two independent criteria: "theoretical acceptability" (in the philosophy of ethics) and "technological feasibility" (in engineering):
- Theoretical acceptability refers to the requirement that the chosen perspective must be defensible under the philosophy of ethics based on ethical theories.
- Technological feasibility refers to the requirement that the chosen perspective must be realizable under engineering in terms of operational and practical implementation.
The harmony between Lessig's and Spinello's approaches is that both are focused on the architecture of cyberspace (code) for implementation and operation. Therefore, these two approaches have greater clarity regarding the technical-engineering language and the potential for operationalization, meeting the criterion of "technological feasibility," compared to Floridi's approach. On the other hand, Floridi's approach surpasses over the other two approaches in terms of "theoretical acceptability" because it emphasizes both "ethical principles" and "case-based judgments," which are core elements of normative ethics and applied ethics. For Floridi's approach to be operationalized in the engineering phase, it requires attention to the other two approaches and a focus on the architecture of cyberspace (code). The implementation of Floridi's perspective regarding the details of case-based ethical judgments (soft ethics) in regulating cyberspace depends on the involvement of an ethicist in the field of cyberspace science and engineering.
saeed Anvari
Abstract
Abstract
In this article, inspired by the theories presented in the methodology of science and the philosophy of science, the process of changing religious beliefs in the study of religions is explained. Accordingly, Popper's falsifications view is similar to the common view of theologians and ...
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Abstract
In this article, inspired by the theories presented in the methodology of science and the philosophy of science, the process of changing religious beliefs in the study of religions is explained. Accordingly, Popper's falsifications view is similar to the common view of theologians and rationalists, who consider religious discussions and debates the main and effective factor in changing people's beliefs. In contrast to this view and relying on historical evidence, the change in the worldview of religious people has been considered similar to the change in the scientific paradigms of scientists from the perspective of Thomas Kuhn. In this way, it has been shown that, contrary to the traditional view of theologians, people do not change their beliefs (religion and sect) solely through theoretical discussions and theological proofs and refutations but are influenced by various social and psychological factors. It has also been shown that different religions and sects have incomparable worldviews, and, as a result, theological disputes are considered polemical debates between the two parties. Accordingly, in religious studies, Kuhn's perspective can be used to explain how individuals' religious attitudes change. Also, within the framework of faithism in the philosophy of religion, the question is answered: How do individuals choose their fait?
Keywords:
Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion, Studies of Religions, Thomas Kuhn, Paradigm, Faithism
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Extended Abstract:
Introduction
In this article, the question in religious studies is answered: What happens when individuals or societies change their religion and religion, but other individuals and societies remain steadfast in their inherited religion?
Materials and Methods
This article has attempted to show that the process of conversion (change of religion in different individuals and societies) is similar to part of Thomas Kuhn's theory in the philosophy of science and that the change of religion and religious people can be viewed from an extra-religious perspective, such as the rejection and acceptance of scientific paradigms by scientists.
Discussion
This article, inspired by Thomas Kuhn's perspective, considers the worldviews presented by different schools of thought as different intellectual paradigms and claims that in justifying individuals' change of religion, one cannot rely solely on the effectiveness of theological arguments. It is necessary to pay attention to crises that arise from historical, social, and psychological factors. Accordingly, just as in the philosophy of science, the positivism and Popper's falsificationism cannot properly explain the structure of scientific revolutions in an interdisciplinary manner in the philosophy of religion and the study of religions, religious debates, and theological refutations and responses cannot be considered the main factor in changing religion and denomination.
Accordingly, this article, inspired by Kuhn's theory, answers the question: In the view of faithism, how does a person searching for faith decide to "Jumps" in a faith? Two perspectives—the traditional and paradigmatic perspectives—can be proposed regarding the process of changing people's beliefs.
A) Traditional view: In the methodology of science, Popper tried to present rational principles for choosing scientific theories. In his view, a scientific theory is refuted by observing examples of contradictions. This view is similar to the method of theologians who try to make religion over other matters in a reasonable way by writing books on refuting or proving religions and sects.
B) Paradigmatic view: This view can be put forward, inspired by Thomas Kuhn's theories, in contrast to the common view of theologians. In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he does not consider scientists impartial and fair people who apply the scientific method to discover facts to get closer to the truth.
Kuhn uses the term "scientific paradigm" to explain his theories. A scientific paradigm is "a set of beliefs, values, issues, and methods shared by the scientific community". Accordingly, a similar concept can be called an intellectual paradigm (religious and religious), a set of theories, beliefs, issues, and methods shared by a school of thought. Here, spiritual and religious experiences among followers of a religion should also be considered part of their paradigm, which plays an important role in maintaining followers of a religion in their beliefs. Accordingly, the "worldview" of religions has been considered comparable to scientific paradigms.
When the fundamental assumptions of a paradigm are challenged, that paradigm is in a critical state. When a new paradigm can explain data and phenomena with greater comprehensiveness, coherence, simplicity, beauty, and convenience, the previous theory is discarded, and the new theory is accepted. Like Kuhn's view, changing religion is a kind of intellectual revolution that causes an individual to move from one worldview to another. In general, the factors that cause individuals to change their religion and beliefs can be expressed as follows: 1. Support from the ruling power; 2. Emotional and psychological factors; 3. Failure to respond to the needs of the time and the existence of social crises; 4. Accumulation of religious errors and lack of knowledge of the errors of other religions
Kuhn believes that paradigms are incommensurable. That is, there is no impartial criterion by which paradigms can be measured, and, ultimately, there is no rational or empirical argument to prove the superiority of one paradigm over another. According to Kuhn, there is an "incommensurability of criteria" and "concepts" and "methodology" between the two paradigms. If this theory is accepted in the field of religions, theological disputes between different religions will be fruitless due to the incommensurability of religious paradigms. In other words, accepting the incommensurability of religious worldviews (paradigms) similarly means that theological discussions are polemical.
Accordingly, all the theological works mentioned below are subject to category mistake:
a) Books that attempt to prove their own beliefs through the sayings and works of other schools. That is, 1) Works that prove the reasons for the legitimacy of an intellectual paradigm through propositions in the rival paradigm and 2) Works that prove the legitimacy of a paradigm based on fabricated evidence in the rival paradigm.
b) Works that demonstrate the invalidity of the rival paradigm by showing the contradictions and irrational content they accept.
c) Books that ridicule the thoughts, words, and actions of the elders and followers of other schools of thought.
d) Books that believe in conspiracy theories explain how another school of thought was based on them.
e) Books that falsify events in support of a school of thought.
f) Books written to refute and prove the beliefs of other religions and sects.
g) Highlighting those who oppose our religion and sect have converted and silenced those who have left our religion and faith.
Conclusion
Therefore, just as in the philosophy of science, the positivism and the falsificationism of Popper cannot correctly explain the structure of scientific revolutions. In the philosophy of religion and the study of religions, religious debates, theological refutations, and answers cannot be considered factors in changing religion and faith. Therefore, in the conflict between reason and faith, rational arguments and religious proofs, refutations, and debates do not play a major role in changing religions
