Document Type : .

Author

Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science and technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies

Abstract

Abstract
This paper critiques the prevailing conflict and independence models of science-religion relations and proposes an alternative approach grounded in the non-justificationist critical rationalism. In this approach, religion provides a meaningful framework for scientific inquiry, helping to avoid methodological nihilism. On the other hand, science collaborates with theology to critically re-examine its foundational concepts, thereby preventing religious dogmatism. The proposed model avoids unnecessary unnecessary antagonism and instead fosters dynamic collaboration, allowing both domains to jointly address existential and ethical challenges. Science and religion can thus enrich each other without collapsing into reductionism or conflation.
Keywords: Science and religion, independence model, fideism, instrumentalism, dogmatism, justificationism, critical rationalism.
 
Introduction
For centuries, the relationship between science and religion has been framed by philosophical paradigms that often intensified tensions. Classic conflict theorists like Draper and White depicted religion as an obstacle to progress, while Protestant theologians like Karl Barth insisted on strict independence, emphasizing faith as irreducible and immune to science. Later proposals, such as Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria,” sought to reduce friction by assigning distinct roles—science answers the “how,” while religion addresses the “why.” Yet these models entrenched separation rather than enabling constructive dialogue.
Materials & Methods
Scholars like Ian Barbour later urged moving beyond rigid dichotomies, framing both science and religion as evolving, open-ended enterprises subject to critique. This paper develops that trajectory by drawing on critical rationalism, arguing that science and religion should be understood not as repositories of fixed truths but as fallible, dynamic processes of discovery. By rejecting justificationism—the insistence on indubitable foundations—the paper advocates for a shared epistemic framework of open critique, where uncertainty fuels growth rather than paralysis.
Discussion & Result
The Traditional Approach (Dogmatic and Institutional)
Dogmatic religion, rooted in fixed doctrines and ritual observance, has often portrayed itself as guardian of ultimate truth. This insistence on certainty produces intellectual stagnation, pits religion against empirical science, and leaves it ill-prepared to address modern existential crises.

Doctrinal rigidity: Institutionalized religion often discourages questioning, prioritizing rigid teachings over intellectual exploration. Ritual becomes a substitute for authentic spiritual wonder, alienating seekers who value inquiry.
Conflict with science: Historical clashes, such as the condemnation of Galileo or resistance to Darwinian evolution, reveal that the problem is less about empirical claims and more about metaphysical worldviews. When theology insists on immutable truths, it exposes itself to vulnerability in the face of scientific revision.
Existential inadequacy: Modern individuals confronting uncertainty, moral complexity, and suffering often find institutional religion’s black-and-white pronouncements inadequate. This disconnect risks either religious retreat into reactionary denial or total irrelevance, reinforcing the divide with science.

The Limits of Science and Rationalism
Science excels at explaining observable phenomena but struggles with metaphysical or existential questions about meaning, morality, and purpose. Instrumentalist philosophies, like those of Duhem and later van Fraassen, attempted to limit science to predictive models rather than claims about reality, thus insulating it from theological disputes. Yet this “retreat” reduces science to mere technology and drains its capacity to inspire wonder.
Even rationalism itself faces paradoxes: it rests on unprovable assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature or the validity of logic. Justificationist approaches demand ultimate grounds, but these either collapse into infinite regress or dogmatic halts. William Bartley’s critique shows how this turns science into a faith in reason. Critical rationalism offers an escape: instead of seeking secure foundations, it embraces fallibility and relentless critique, treating uncertainty as the motor of progress.
Non-Realist Approaches
Disillusionment with both dogmatic religion and science’s silence on existential questions has fueled various non-realist strategies to separate the two realms.

Existentialist and spiritualist views (e.g., Schleiermacher, Buber): Religion becomes a matter of subjective experience and immediate relation rather than truth claims. While this avoids dogmatism, it risks relativism, blurring distinctions between authentic experience and illusion, and sidelining religion’s ethical and social dimensions.
Polanyi’s tacit knowledge: By likening science to tradition-bound practices akin to religion, Polanyi highlights the role of commitment and personal participation. Yet this emphasis risks turning science into a quasi-religious, authority-driven activity, vulnerable to elitism and relativism.
Instrumentalism (Duhem, van Fraassen): Scientific theories are treated as useful fictions for prediction, leaving metaphysics and theology unchallenged. However, this truce weakens both domains: science loses its explanatory depth, while religion retreats into symbolic consolation.
Framework approaches (Wittgensteinian approaches): Science and religion are seen as distinct “language-games” with their own internal rules, immune to mutual critique. This enshrines separation but blocks critical engagement across domains, effectively silencing dialogue.

These non-realist approaches may ease tensions, but they do so by diminishing the critical and existential vitality of both science and religion.
The Critical Rationalist Approach
In contrast, critical rationalism insists that both science and religion remain open to critique. Religion, while offering meaning and moral grounding, must not rest on immutable dogmas. Myths and doctrines can serve as provisional interpretations, much like scientific theories, subject to reinterpretation in light of new understanding.
This approach sees both science and religion as fallible quests for truth, sharing the virtues of curiosity, humility, and openness. Neither domain offers final certainty, but both can enrich each other through dialogue. Examples from history—Galileo’s defiance of ecclesiastical authority, Newton and Boyle’s blending of piety and scientific rigor, Einstein’s “cosmic religion”—illustrate how science and religion have often intersected as complementary expressions of wonder and inquiry.
Critical rationalism reframes faith not as unquestioning belief but as an existential openness: a readiness to pursue meaning without guarantees. Similarly, science becomes more than technological utility, recovering its role as a source of awe and ethical orientation. Both activities embody a Socratic spirit: courage in confronting uncertainty and commitment to ongoing self-correction.
 
Conclusion
Science-religion dialogue, the paper argues, must be grounded in critical rationalism rather than dogmatism or compartmentalization. By shifting focus from rigid certainties to dynamic processes of questioning, this approach preserves both the existential depth of religion and the investigatory vigor of science.
Religion contributes a horizon of meaning and ethical motivation that science alone cannot provide, while science challenges theology to shed authoritarianism and remain intellectually alive. This reciprocal critique transforms conflict into collaboration, enabling both domains to address humanity’s deepest questions—about existence, morality, and truth.
The paper ultimately envisions a culture of “epistemic humility,” where neither faith nor reason claims infallibility, but both join in the shared human project of seeking meaning. Science, seen as a quasi-religious quest for truth, and religion, reimagined as an open-ended dialogue, become complementary companions in humanity’s endless but purposeful journey of discovery.

Keywords

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