Abstract
This paper argues that the problem of evil is not exclusively a theological issue for theists. A distinct version of it, termed the “Existential Problem of Systemic Evil,” challenges both theism and atheism alike. This problem, especially when applied to atheism, presents a deeper dilemma due to its implications regarding the structural nature of suffering. By asserting that not only particular events but the entire biological structure of the world is fundamentally marked by evil, this critique undermines any optimistic view of existence. The article demonstrates that both many theists and contemporary atheists-most notably Richard Dawkins-implicitly accept an existential optimism: a belief that the world is overall good and life within it is worth gratitude and joy. However, this optimism is inconsistent with the pervasive systemic suffering observed in nature. Hence, the systemic evil problem becomes a potent critique not just of theism, but also of naturalistic atheism.
Keywords
Systemic Existential Evil, Classical Problem of Evil, Biological Order, Existential Optimism, Atheism, Theism
Introduction
The existence of evil and suffering in the world has long been a fundamental concern in theology and philosophy of religion. Historically, the most prominent articulation of this problem is found in the writings of David Hume, and prior to him, Epicurus. The traditional problem of evil challenges the coherence of belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent God given the undeniable reality of evil in the world. Richard Dawkins, one of the most vocal contemporary atheists, revives this challenge by portraying suffering as pervasive, deeply embedded in nature, and incompatible with theistic claims. While the classical formulation targets theists, this paper proposes that evil poses an equally serious, if not greater, challenge to atheism. A particular form of this issue, named the "Existential Problem of Systemic Evil," suggests that evil is not merely episodic but structurally ingrained in biological reality itself. This critique is advanced especially against forms of atheism-like that of Dawkins-which maintain a surprisingly optimistic stance toward life and the universe.
Materials and Methods
This research employs a conceptual and philosophical analysis, drawing from primary texts by Richard Dawkins and classical theodicy literature. The methodology is qualitative and analytical, rooted in hermeneutical reading of Dawkins's corpus, particularly focusing on themes related to existential meaning, suffering, and gratitude. The article also applies critical social theory to examine the metaphysical assumptions underlying Dawkins's naturalism.
Key texts include:

Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (2006)
Richard Dawkins, The Magic of Reality (2011)
Classical sources such as:

David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Swinburne’s theodical responses


Dawkins’s writings are analyzed not merely for direct claims but also for implied metaphysical and axiological commitments regarding the nature of the world and human existence.
Discussion ∞ Result
Dawkins argues that the sheer ubiquity of suffering-observable across the evolutionary history of life-makes belief in a benevolent deity untenable. However, this paper highlights a contradiction in his view. Despite acknowledging immense suffering, Dawkins simultaneously expresses sentiments of wonder, gratitude, and existential joy toward the universe, often celebrating life’s complexity and grandeur. This duality is read as a form of “existential optimism.” Yet, if systemic suffering is indeed a biological constant-an inherent feature of the evolutionary system-then such optimism is logically incoherent. Unlike theists, atheists lack the metaphysical resources to redeem suffering through eschatology or divine justice. Hence, they face a more acute form of the existential problem of evil. Moreover, this systemic form of evil-wherein predation, disease, decay, and death are built into the natural order-cannot be addressed by theodical strategies. Instead, it raises the question: on what grounds does the atheist maintain that life is meaningful or worth celebration in the face of such overwhelming systemic brutality?
The key finding of this paper is that the existential problem of systemic evil turns the traditional critique of theism on its head. By framing suffering as ontological rather than episodic, the critique extends beyond religion to challenge secular naturalism. In this framework, Dawkins’s atheism appears vulnerable: his worldview presumes a baseline positivity toward existence that the biological structure of suffering cannot justify. The systemic evil argument thus serves as a powerful philosophical tool-not only against theodicies but also against atheistic existential meaning-making. While theists may appeal to divine purpose to contextualize suffering, atheists like Dawkins must either abandon existential optimism or confront the full nihilistic implications of a suffering-laden cosmos.
Conclusion
The existential version of the problem of systemic evil expands the scope of traditional theodicy discourse. It introduces a shared philosophical challenge to both theists and atheists, questioning the coherence of optimistic outlooks in a world marked by structural suffering. In doing so, it calls for deeper reflection on the foundations of meaning, gratitude, and the nature of reality-regardless of one’s theological or atheistic commitments.