Abstract
This paper explores whether the relationship between theism and atheism can be elevated from a state of opposition to one of epistemic dialogue through the lens of the relationship between science and religion. It argues that the traditional dichotomies between belief and disbelief—and between science and religion—stem largely from conceptual oversimplifications and a failure to distinguish between the content and the methods of belief formation. The paper proceeds by reinterpreting theism and atheism not as fixed metaphysical positions but as epistemic attitudes that emerge within different methodological frameworks.
By distinguishing between belief content and epistemic methods, the study demonstrates that the apparent conflict between science and religion arises not from their subject matter but from methodological incongruence. Within this framework, three classical models of science–religion interaction—conflict, independence, and potential compatibility—are reexamined. The study concludes that by adopting a perspective informed by social epistemology and the epistemology of religious disagreement, the encounter between theism and atheism can evolve from mutual negation into a constructive, rational, and dialogical engagement that fosters both intellectual humility and spiritual growth.
Introduction
The question of how science and religion relate has been one of the most persistent philosophical and theological debates throughout history. From the medieval synthesis of faith and reason to Enlightenment empiricism and contemporary analytic philosophy, scholars have repeatedly asked whether science and religion represent rival explanatory systems or complementary perspectives on reality. In the modern period, with the rise of empirical science and the increasing authority of experimental methods, this question has acquired new significance, positioning itself at the center of epistemological debates in the philosophy of religion.
The relationship between theism and atheism is deeply entangled with this broader discussion. Philosophical and cultural judgments about science and religion inevitably bear on the fundamental question: Does God exist, and can belief in God be rationally justified? Yet contemporary analysis shows that the line separating theism and atheism is not an immutable metaphysical divide but rather a fluid boundary shaped by linguistic conventions, historical contexts, and epistemic frameworks. Both positions may draw upon data, motivations, or forms of reasoning that emerge within scientific or religious contexts. Therefore, to understand their relationship, one must analyze not only the content of beliefs but also the methods by which these beliefs are formed, justified, and maintained.
Materials and Methods
The study employs the theoretical lens of social epistemology, which conceives knowledge and justification not as purely individual achievements but as socially embedded processes involving trust, communication, and epistemic institutions. Within this framework, science and religion are treated as two distinct yet potentially overlapping epistemic systems—each with its own norms of evidence, validation, and authority.
The paper also draws on the epistemology of disagreement, particularly recent debates about religious disagreement (Pittard, 2014; Schellenberg, 2015). This approach examines how rational agents should respond when confronted with equally informed and epistemically competent interlocutors who hold contrary religious beliefs. The notion of epistemic peers—individuals with comparable cognitive abilities and access to similar evidence—plays a key role here. By situating theism and atheism within this dialogical context, the study seeks to reconceptualize their interaction as an instance of epistemic negotiation rather than a contest of dogmatic assertions.
Methodologically, the research combines conceptual analysis and comparative evaluation. It first revisits three influential models of the science–religion relationship—(1) the model of inevitable conflict, (2) the model of non-conflict or independence, and (3) the model of Potential Conflict (Murray, 2008; Gould, 1997)—and then interprets them in light of social epistemology. This synthesis enables a more dynamic understanding of how belief systems can coexist, challenge, or inform one another within pluralistic epistemic communities.
Discussion and Results
The analysis begins by addressing the conceptual ambiguity surrounding terms like theism and atheism. Following Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance, the paper argues that these categories should not be understood as rigidly defined essences but as clusters of practices, commitments, and interpretive frameworks that share overlapping features. Theism thus encompasses a range of belief forms—from classical monotheism to experiential or symbolic faith—while atheism spans positions from explicit denial to agnostic suspension of belief.
In the next step, the paper revisits the historical models of the science–religion relation. The inevitable conflict model interprets the two as inherently incompatible, viewing scientific progress as a challenge to religious authority. The non-conflict model or independence, in contrast, asserts that science and religion operate in non-overlapping domains—science addressing empirical reality, religion addressing moral and existential meaning. The potential conflict model mediates between the two, acknowledging points of tension while maintaining that such conflicts can often be resolved through interpretive adjustment and epistemic humility. Gould’s concept of Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) exemplifies this middle path, suggesting that harmony can be achieved by respecting the distinct magisteria of science and religion.
However, by incorporating insights from social epistemology, the paper extends this typology beyond mere coexistence. It suggests that epistemic interaction between science and religion—analogous to dialogue between theists and atheists—can produce epistemic growth: an expansion of understanding through recognition of cognitive limitations and engagement with alternative perspectives. The central claim is that conflict arises not from the content of belief systems but from methodological exclusivism—the refusal of one epistemic community to acknowledge the legitimacy of another’s methods.
Furthermore, the discussion examines religious disagreement as a test case for epistemic interaction. When two epistemic peers—say, a theist and an atheist—hold incompatible beliefs about God, the rational response is not necessarily suspension of belief (as conciliatory theorists argue) nor stubborn persistence (as steadfast theorists claim). Instead, a socially grounded epistemology recognizes the relational dimension of justification: rationality involves ongoing responsiveness to others within a network of shared epistemic norms. In this sense, religious disagreement can function as a catalyst for intellectual humility, dialogical engagement, and moral growth, rather than as evidence of epistemic failure.
Conclusion
The study concludes that theism and atheism, when viewed through the framework of social epistemology and the contemporary dialogue between science and religion, should not be conceived as opposing metaphysical doctrines but as epistemic positions in dialogue. The conflict between them, far from being inevitable, reflects deeper methodological and social dynamics. Recognizing this fact enables a shift from antagonism to critical cooperation.
The paper’s key findings are as follows:

Theism and atheism are not fixed ontological commitments but socially and historically situated epistemic stances.
The perceived conflict between science and religion arises primarily from methodological misunderstanding rather than from incompatible truth-claims.
Within social epistemology, rational belief involves responsiveness to epistemic peers and recognition of cognitive limits.
Religious disagreement, when engaged constructively, can promote intellectual humility, mutual respect, and the ethical dimension of belief.

Ultimately, this research proposes that the dialogue between theism and atheism—like the dialogue between science and religion—can become a model of rational cooperation grounded in shared epistemic virtues such as openness, humility, and respect for evidence. Rather than eroding faith, such dialogue enriches both faith and reason by situating them within a broader ecology of human understanding.