Zeinab Amin; Rasoul Rasoulipour
Abstract
Discussion about the divine attributes has a long term history in theology and philosophy. Among all of the divine attributes, “knowledge” has received more attention because of its effectiveness in determining all of the verbal issues related to interpretation of this divine specification. ...
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Discussion about the divine attributes has a long term history in theology and philosophy. Among all of the divine attributes, “knowledge” has received more attention because of its effectiveness in determining all of the verbal issues related to interpretation of this divine specification. Avicenna and Duns Scotus are representatives of the two main theories about the Gos’d knowledge among the Islamic and Christian philosophers whom I have studies and compared in this research. The main difference between these two philosophers in divine knowledge can be recorded as Scotus’ God is a purposeful actor (fa’el-e bel-qasd), however, Avicenna introduces the God as the wise and single-minded actor (fa’el-e-bel-enayah) justifying the creation based on the grace. While there is this big difference, there are many similarities between these two opinions; such as, both of them consider God as a cause for creation. Both believe in existence of creatures in divine knowledge before their real creation without considering reasonable forms or platonic parables as separated creatures. Both of them believe that God has no other purpose except for his essence for creation of universe or human.
Shaker Lavaei; Tayebe Rezaei Rah
Volume 7, Issue 14 , March 2017, , Pages 79-95
Abstract
The argument from contingency which was first put forward by Al-Farabi, was subsequently developed by Avicenna. Al-Farabi's argument is based on the impossibility of an infinite regres, but Avicenna proves this imopssibility during his argument. So, to accept the Avicennian argument one doesn’t ...
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The argument from contingency which was first put forward by Al-Farabi, was subsequently developed by Avicenna. Al-Farabi's argument is based on the impossibility of an infinite regres, but Avicenna proves this imopssibility during his argument. So, to accept the Avicennian argument one doesn’t need to accept the impossibility of an infinite regres in advanced. This is one of the differences between Al-Farabi's and Avicenna's argument from contingency. Although Avicenna claims to have brought a greater innovation in Al-Isharat, and he maintains that this argument proves the existence of the necessary being even with the possibility of an infinite regress, his claim seems unjustified, since first, in contrast to Avicenna's claim and what is commonly believed, there is no crucial distinction between Avicenna's argument from contingency in Al-Isharat and the ones mentioned in Al-Mabdaa- wa-Al-maad and Al-Nijat. And second, his claim is not true about any of his arguments.
Another major flaw in Avicennian argument is his stance on the criterion of the need for a cause.
On the other hand, Mulla sadra's objection to this argument is not acceptable as well. He says contrary to Avicenna's claim, the chain of contingent things is not a contingent being. But Mulla sadra's argument has two problems. First, it's based on the premise that "existence is coextensive with unity" which can not be used as the middle term of an argument. Second, this objection is in conflict with his theory of the real unity of the universe.
